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Raoul Berger's Fourteenth
Amendment-Abuse by Contraction
vs. Abuse by Expansion
.By WALLACE MENDELSON*

Introduction
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the laws thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
If one man alone had produced the Fourteenth Amendment, we
would have to judge him muddle-headed, inarticulate, and without
much legal training or experience. Derived as it was from the efforts of
the thirty-ninth Congress, surely its opacity reflects a noble, platonic
ideal along with cross-currents of doubt, disagreement and misunderstanding as to what the great conception was to mean in mundane application. In short, the Amendment reeks of compromise.2
The problem facing the framers was to reconcile radical, moderate
and conservative Republican political views and to achieve ratification
by three-fourths of the states, with all their varied views and interests.
The solution was high-blown rhetoric with minimal specific contentconstitutional rhetoric which has meant all things to all judges whether
on the right or on the left. Justice Field, for example, held that the
* Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin; B.A. 1933, University of
Wisconsin; LL.B. 1936, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1940, University of Wisconsin.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, for example, said of the proposed amendment:
"This proposition is not all that the committee [on Reconstruction] desired. It falls far short
of my wishes, but it fulfills my hopes. I believe it is all that can be obtained in the present
state of public opinion. Not only Congress but the several States are to be consulted....
Mutual concession, therefore, is our only resort, or mutual hostilities." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2459, 3148 (1866) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE].
[4371
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Amendment incorporated "the pursuit of happiness" as found in the
Declaration of 1776, which for him meant economic laissez-faire 3 but
not protection for blacks.4 Justice Bradley found it compatible with
blatant male chauvinism;5 others have seen in it the basis for equality
between the sexes.' The first Justice Harlan discovered in the privileges
or immunities and due process clauses an incorporation of the Bill of

Rights. 7 Others discerned in the due process or equal protection guarantees constitutional support for liberty of contract,' the fair value doctrine 9 and "separate but equal" facilities for blacks.' 0 Justices Black
3. See, e.g., Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field,
J., concurring). There Justice Field stressed the rationale behind his Slaughter-House Cases
dissent: the view that the right to pursue the trade or business of one's choice was an "essential element of that freedom" which is the birthright of every citizen. Id. at 757. He therefore believed that the exercise of a state's police power does not extend to granting the
alleged monopoly. Id. at 758, 760.
4. ExparteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting, joined by Clifford,
J.). Justice Field here disagreed with the view that the rights of black citizens were violated
by their exclusion as jurors on the grounds that only "civil" and not "political" rights were
granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 367. As a natural extension of criminal
punishment for judges who deliberately excluded blacks from juries, which a majority of the
Court upheld, he saw the possibility that equal protection would require the appointment of
black judges. This prospect, he wrote, was "not in accordance with the understanding of the
people as to the meaning of those terms since the organization of the government." Id. at
370.
5. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in
the judgment, joined by Swayne & Field, JJ.). Agreeing that women had no constitutional
right to be considered for admission to the Bar, Justice Bradley stated: "The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." Id. at 141.
6. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Four Justices in Frontiero
were willing to treat sex classifications as "suspect", a view which would require that any
statute discriminating on the basis of gender be supported by a showing that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Id. at 682-83. Four other Justices
were unwilling to adopt this approach, but found that the statute at issue, which allowed a
woman member of the armed services to claim her husband as a dependent only upon a
showing that he received over half of his support from her while not requiring male servicemen to make such a showing, was arbitrary and bore no rational relationship to a legitimate
state objective. Id. at 691.-92.
7. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 117-18 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan believed that the principle underlying the privilege against self-incrimination had
become embodied in our common law by the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment and was therefore a privilege of national citizenship. d. at 119-21. Resuscitating the privileges or immunities clause from the limbo of the Slaughter-House Cases, he
viewed it, along with the due process clause, as a means of applying the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to the states. Id. at 123-24.
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See notes 25-27 and accompanying text
infra.
9. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The "fair value doctrine" was the Court's
response to a challenge brought by a railroad against allegedly unreasonably low intrastate
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and Douglas held that section 1 "taken as a whole" incorporates the
"specific," and "clearly marked constitutional boundaries" of the Bill

of Rights and no more.I' On the latter point Justice Douglas subse-

quently changed his mind. 2 Later still he insisted that due process

protects a penumbral right to privacy embracing abortion' 3 and the use
of contraceptives. 4 The "specific" and "clearly marked. . . boundaries" of the Bill of Rights obviously had expanded. 5 Yet the newly

discovered right of privacy, it seems, does not include
private, consen17
16
styles.
hair
of
choice
or
homosexuality
sual, adult
passenger rates set by a state legislature. In upholding a decree restraining enforcement of
the state act, the Court enunciated a formula by which "fair value" might be determined,
and which would provide a supposedly fair return to the company while at the same time
not extracting more from the public than the service was reasonably worth. Id. at 547.
10. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Pessy held that the "separate but equal"
railroad coaches required by a Louisiana statute were not in conflict with the Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendments. Such separation did not, in the Court's opinion, impose a "badge
of inferiority." .d. at 551.
11. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75, 91-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting,
joined by Douglas, J.). Justice Black saw the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as extending "to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of
Rights." Id. at 89. This "clearly marked constitutional boundar[y]" would discourage the
Court's tendency to "roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness." Id. at 91-92. See also Mendelson, Mr. Justice Black's Fourteenth Amendment, 53
MINN L. REv. 711 (1969).
12. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
explicitly stated: "I do not think [due process] is restricted and confined to [the first eight
Amendments]." Id. at 516. He then embarked on defining the "emanations" from specific
guarantees which gave content to the concept of "liberty." Id. at 516-17. This approach
reached fruition in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See note 14 infra.
13. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 214-15 (1973) (Douglas, J. concurring). This opinion
also applied to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas' opinion for the Griswold Court set forth the elusive "penumbra-emanations doctrine" through which certain
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights were found to include penumbrae, rights not specifically set forth in the text of the Constitution but the existence of which could be judicially
implied. The penumbras emanating from various constitutional guarantees were held to
form a zone of privacy around the marital relationship. Id. at 484-86. A statute which
forbade the use of contraceptives, thus impinged on the constitutionally protected right of
privacy, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 481,
485.
15. Id. at 482-83.
16. The Court declined to hear oral argument in Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y for
Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'dmem., 425 U.S. 985 (1976). Its summary
affirmance in Doe served to endorse the enforcement of criminal statutes against private,
consensual homosexual acts. The Court again refused to consider the constitutionality of
such laws, either on their face or as applied, by denying certiorari in Enslin v. Bean, 436 U.S.
912 (1978).
17. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Olff v. East Side Union High School, 445
F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972).
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In other contexts, the equal protection guarantee has been held to
authorize judicially imposed busing' and reapportionment, 9 the latter
to save us from, inter alia, representation by "trees and acres" in state

legislatures, although that seems quite permissible (and not troublesome) in the national Senate. Fourteenth Amendment due process
eventually came to incorporate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury

trial,2" although not by the traditional jury of twelve: six would suffice,21 but not five.2 2 Moreover, the new version of trial by jury-repudiating an old tradition-permits non-unanimous convictions except,
thanks to a single Justice, in federal cases.2 3 Perhaps strangest of all,
some rights deemed so "fundamental" as to be implicit in the due proc-

ess concept are nonetheless not basic enough to require retroactive application for everyone.24
What many or all of these and related views have in common is
make-believe, both in substance and method. At first the Court was
quite direct, outspoken and dogmatic-as in Lochner v. New York: 25
"There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of per-

son or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in
the occupation of a baker. . . We do not believe in the soundness of
the views which uphold this law."26 No doubt mindful of what happened to Lochner2 7 and to the "nine old men" and the debasement of
the Lochner majority's view, neo-activists seem to have grown quite

public-relations conscious. In any event their opinions seem more and
more devious, sloganistic and directed to the human thirst for
18. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
19. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
21. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
22. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, cert. denied436 U.S. 962 (1978).
23. Justice Powell concurred in the Court's approval of non-unanimity in a non-capital
state prosecutions, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (PoA ell, J., separate opinion), but adhered to the view that unanimity was required infederajury trials by the virtue
of Sixth Amendment, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Linkletter held that the exclusionary rule adopted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would not be applied retroactively to decisions which were final prior to the date of the Mapp opinion. 381 U.S. at 639.
25. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26. Id. at 57, 61.
27. Loehner's substantive due process approach has been roundly criticized and was
explicitly disavowed by later Courts. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962):
"We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,' and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."' Id. at 731-32 (footnotes omitted).
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fairytales-which is to say that modem Supreme Court opinions are
often quite inept as legal documents. In this new genre the Douglas
effort in Griswold v. Connecticut2" is a classic. Some of us may be excused for thinking Justice Douglas was far too astute to be taken in by
his own ploy. Surely his purpose was to obscure (for lesser minds) a
raw exercise of judicial fiat. Make-believe, it seems, is activism's concession to the Rule of Law. Never again have activist judges dared to
be as forthright' as they were in Lochner.2 9
Behind the verbal ambiguity of the Fourteenth Amendment lay a
problem of morality. On one basic issue the North and South were
largely in agreement: blacks were generally considered inherently inferior beings.30 Yet the Civil War had cost the North dearly, and this
sacrifice was not to be forgotten. The South had erred; indeed in the
view of many it had sinned. But even in defeat she was defiant: witness the Black Codes,3 1 the bloody anti-Negro riots in Memphis and
New Orleans, lesser ones elsewhere and the election of Confederate
leaders to high post-bellum state and national offices. As James G.
Blaine observed: "If the Southern men had intended, as their one special and desirable aim, to inflame public opinion of the North...,
they would have proceeded precisely as they did."32 Finally, Lincoln's
murder was thought by many to have sprung from a southern
conspiracy.
All in all the North was deeply troubled, if not altogether outraged. It saw in President Johnson's lenient Reconstruction a risk of
losing the peace after winning the war-a risk of continued slavery
under a new name. Southern laws on vagrancy and breach of labor
contracts had already established a kind of peonage in several southern
states.33 The problem was not only that the North might lose the peace;
it might also lose control of Congress. 34 Reestablishment of the potent,
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See note 14 supra.
29. For a brief survey of periods of activism on the Supreme Court, see Mendelson,
Separation,Politics and JudicialActivism, 52 IND. L.J. 313 (1977).
30. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 10-15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY] and authorities cited therein.
31. The Black Codes established restrictions on blacks with regard to litigation, labor,
property ownership and many other aspects of life. Representative Black Codes are collected in 1 FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 273-312 (1906) and in
MCPHERSON, HISTORY OF THE RECONSTRUCTION 29-44 (1871).
32. See 2 S.E. MORRISON, ET. AL., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
334 (1977).
33. See note 32 supra.
34. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in extending full citizenship to blacks,
threatened to upset the electoral balance that had been maintained under art. I, section 2, of
the Constitution (the "three-fifths" clause).
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pre-war West-South agrarian political alliance was a real possibility
and not a negligible threat to northern industrial well-being.
In this context of "sin" and politico-economic danger, it was, perhaps, inevitable that radical Republicanism might carry the North further than it really cared to go. Reconstruction involved a kind of moral
taxation without effective representation. Slavery and the black population after all were concentrated largely in the South. The great migrations still lay far in the future. Millions of Americans in the North
and West had never even seen a black; millions more had never had
any significant relationship with one-and never would. In such circumstances, legal or moral Reconstruction necessarily entailed a builtin double standard. The onus of reform had to fall far more heavily
upon one region and one group than upon any other. As a practical
matter, the problem was "reform thy neighbor"-always more attractive than reforming one's self. Most or many who supported the Civil
War Amendments must have found in them a great moral imperative
which would cost them nothing. Some obviously believed that souther "sin" required atonement by suffering and humiliation. 35 Despite
its broad language, the Fourteenth Amendment apparently seemed to
many, perhaps most, of its supporters to be a lash more applicable to
others (sinners) than to themselves. Thus, contemporaneously with ratification of their new Amendment, the Republicans could write a
double standard into their 1868 party platform:
The guaranty by Congress of equal suffrage to all loyal men
at the South was demanded by every consideration of public
safety, of gratitude, and of justice, and must be maintained; while
the question of suffrage in all loyal [non-Southern]
States prop36
erly belongs to the people of those States.
Only after achieving political security in the 1868 presidential election
victory of Grant did the radicals begin their all-out fight for nationwide
black suffrage. How different its anticipated impact in the North, with
relatively few blacks, vis-a-vis what might be expected in Dixie, where
in many areas ex-slaves constituted a majority or at least a sizeable
bloc.
The Fourteenth Amendment, then, presents a double embarrassment: an ambiguous edict adopted by men who knew that its real-life
impact must be at best grossly uneven, and that in any event it would
not be uniformly applied. The latter supposition is supported by his35. See, e.g., GLOBE, supranote 2, at 631, 833, 1159, 2773. Various speakers inveighed
against the barbarity of Southern treatment of blacks.
36. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 98 (1961).
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tory. The new law was not enforced in the North. It was soon found
too revolutionary, too subversive of accepted ways of life to be enforced in the South without troops. Yet extended military occupation
was out of the question. When that ended by mutual consent, the
Fourteenth Amendment became with respect to blacks little more than
a tabled promise. Almost a century later, spurred perhaps by Nazi racism, the nation came to see that the South had not been alone in error
and that the Civil War Amendments apply to everyone. The old, futile
policy of regional Reconstruction gave way to national Reconstruction.
Meanwhile an enigmatic basic law calculated to promote fair treatment
of blacks was made to serve quite different purposes: at first economic
laissez-faire,3 7 and later that unique experiment in government by
judges called Warren Court activism.3" Against this background I now
offer an approach to section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment which
seems to me more compatible with the Rule of Law, and consent of the
governed, than the Supreme Court has given us for many years. I offer
first some general observations on constitutional construction, then a
revised opinion for the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases,3 9 the
Court's first brush with the Fourteenth Amendment. This is by way of
agreement and disagreement with Raoul Berger's Government by
Judiciary.
I. Constitutional Construction
In Marbury v. Madison4 ° the Court made much of the fact that
ours is a "written Constitution." Such language occurs at least seven
times in Chief Justice Marshall's unanimous opinion. It expresses the
premise of his holding that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
may go beyond the mandate of the written words. 4 ' What is involved,
37. See, e.g., Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
38. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote in
school district elections); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (reapportionment). See generally Mendelson, The
Politics of JudicialActivism, 24 EMORY L.J. 43 (1975): "Reapportionment and a new national code of criminal case procedure, for example, were instigated by judicial fiat without
any significant political discussion. An inverse relationship between Court and [political]
party power may not be a peculiarity of our day, however. It seems rather a peculiarity of
our system. In fact judicial pretension appears to have thrived only in periods of unusual
weakness in our political processes; at other times it has been effectively rebuffed. In short
'government by judges' seems no more possible than flaws in the party system permit it to
be." Id. at 43-44.
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
40. 5 U.S. (I Cr.) 137 (1803).
41. The Marshall Court's broad view of national, Ze. congressional, power in McCul-
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of course, is the principle of government by law as distinct from government by men. The Marshall Court subsequently ran into an ancient
problem: writing does not insure clarity in communication. Faced
with this difficulty in Gibbons v. Ogden,42 the Chief Justice called up a
centuries-old aid to construction: the Rule in Heydon's Case.4 3 This
holds that a clue to the meaning of ambiguous language in a formal
document can often be found in the circumstances that begot the document and the language at issue. As Chief Justice Marshall put it:
If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a wellsettled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially
when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself [to form
a more perfect union], should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the
present case. 44
45
The result was an expansive reading of the national commerce power.
In the same case, however, when the Court found the Constitution less
than clear with respect to state authority vis-A-vis interstate commerce-as to which the application of Heydon's Rule yielded no clueMarshall, eschewing broad nationalism, bypassed the matter by deciding the case on another ground.46
Twenty-five years later, the Taney Court recognized that an issue
must be deemed nonjusticiable, and left for resolution by the political
processes, if there are no judicially discoverable standards to guide adloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), was anticipated in THE FEDERALIST No..
33, No. 44 (A. Hamilton), and is indeed based on the written words of the Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. Moreover, the power in question is a legislative power limited by the
electoral process and a tripartite (Senate, House, Executive Branch) system of checks and
balances. This is a far cry from the Court's claim to power, for example, in Lochner, Smyth,
Linkletter and Swann. See notes 8, 9, 18, 24 and accompanying text w-pra.
42. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The issue in Gibbons centered on the interpretation of
the commerce clause. In order to decide whether a state could grant an exclusive privilege to
navigate state waters for passenger trade, the Court found it necessary to define virtually
every term of the clause.
43. 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584).
44. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188-89 (1824).
45. Commercial divisiveness among the states and inadequate central authority to deal
with it were major problems under the Articles of Confederation. The constitutional response was the commerce power granted to Congress by article I, section 8. In this light, the
Marshall Court concluded the Founders must have meant the commerce power to be as
extensive as the problems it was calculated to cure.
46. Although the Gibbons Court seemed explicitly to favor the exclusive, or nationalist,
view, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197, 199-200, it did not so hold, apparently for want of any
indication that such was the purpose of the Founders. Instead, the Court held that the New
York law granting exclusive steamship privileges was inconsistent with an act of Congress
authorizing licensed steamboats to pursue the coastal trade.
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judication.47 As Chief Justice Hughes put it when the Court refused to
decide whether a proposed constitutional amendment had expired be-

cause it had not been ratified within a "reasonable" time: "Where are

to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination? ' 48 What
these cases teach is simply this: even Supreme Court Justices owe allegiance to the Rule of Law, to say nothing of their special obligations in
a polity based on the diffusion of power and the consent of the governed. Judicial edicts derived from standards not discernible in statute

or Constitution is government by judges.
On these premises I offer a revised opinion of the Court for the
Slaughter-House Cases,4 9 wherein the Fourteenth Amendment got off
to a bad judicial start. The Court's decision upheld a state regulation
of the slaughtering industry which had been challenged as unconstitutional under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 50 Reaching
the same result, I will confine my opinion to that part of the case which
concerns the meaning of the privileges or immunities, due process and

equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 ' I agree with

47. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Luther involved a struggle between
two political factions in the state of Rhode Island, each of which claimed to be the established government.
48. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453 (1939).
49. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
50. The Louisiana statute was aimed at protecting the health of the inhabitants of New
Orleans. It specified certain areas where slaughtering would be permitted, and chartered a
corporation to provide appropriate slaughter-houses. All butchers could use these facilities
upon payment of state approved fees; the corporation was granted a twenty-five year monopoly on the slaughter-house operation. The statute was challenged on Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Mr. Justice Miller, writing for a five-four majority, read
the privileges or immunities clause as granting United States citizenship to all persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and state citizenship to such persons in their state of
residence. Id. at 74. But the clause was construed as extending only those privileges or
immunities which were incident tofederal citizenship, not those incident to state citizenship.
In determining which privileges or immunities were conferred by state citizenship, Justice
Miller relied primarily on Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
In Corield,Justice Washington enumerated certain fundamental privileges which citizens
enjoyed by virtue of state citizenship under article IV, section 2 of the Constitution: "Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.... The
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or reside in any other state, for purposes of
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of
habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher
taxes or impositions than are paid by the citizens of the other state. . . ." Id. at 551-52.
Since the privilege claimed in the challenge to the Louisiana statute could arguably be
derived from those privileges enumerated in Co/ield,Justice Miller concluded that it was
not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges or immunities clause.
51. The following revised opinion for the Slaughter-House Cases does not explicitly
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Raoul Berger that the two latter provisions have been savagely abused
by judicial "interpretation." However, I question his view that they

were meant merely to be adjuncts for implementing the privileges or

immunities clause, 52 and that the latter "had [a] clearly defined and
narrow compass" revealed in the "rights. . . enumerated" in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.11 Raoul Berger's response to abuse by expansion

seems to me to constitute abuse by contraction.
H. The Slaughter-House Cases-Revised Opinion
1. The Privileges or Immunities Clause
Petitioners' main contention is that the Louisiana statute as applied to them violates the constitutional mandate that "No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . ... -" What are the "privileges
or immunities" of American citizenship? Nowhere in the Constitution

or any act of Congress do we find a definition. Nor are we aware of
any common law, or other tradition or usage, or any dictionary, that
elucidates this inherently obscure and enigmatic terminology. It is in a
word unintelligible. Where then are we to discover criteria for judicial
determination of the issue before us?
address the problem of racial segregation. Neither did the congressional discussion of the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment; indeed the matter was hardly mentioned. The reason
seems clear: racial segregation had not yet become the vicious, all-pervading thing that it
would be a generation later. See C.V. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE C XREER OF JIM CROW
(1960). The Court apparently first faced them question of segregation a few months after the
Slaughter-House decision. Congress had chartered a railroad and provided that "no person
shall be excluded from [its] cars on account of color." Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 805. The
Court found that this enactment was not satisfied by the provision of cars assigned exclusively to people of color, though such cars were as good as those assigned exclusively for
white persons. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wail.) 445 (1873). The Court noted that
Congress had enacted the statute in response to existing discrimination, not in response to
the exclusion of blacks from railroad cars. In interpreting the statute as demanding equal
access to all cars, the Court noted the railroad's "ingenious attempt to evade a compliance
with the obvious meaning of the requirement." Id. at 452. In short, "separate but equal"
was not permissible under the Act of Congress. Surely the Slaughter-House Court would
have reached the same result afortioriin an analogous case arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
52. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 166-220.
53. Id. at 18, 36. The rights delineated in section 1 of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 were:
"That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities. . . on account of race
. . . but the inhabitants of every race. . . shall have the same right to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, and shall be subject to like punishment. . . and no
other." GLOBE, supra note 2, at 474.
54. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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We find no help-indeed only more confusion-in the proceedings of the thirty-ninth Congress which proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mr. Fellows in an able brief for the petitioners has traced
more than a little of the legislative history of the troublesome term.
There can be no doubt of his diligence and high ability. His efforts
confirm what our own indicate: the "intention" of Congress is as obscure as its language. Even the views of the three chief congressional
sponsors of the measure are mutually contradictory. Congressman
John Bingham, the James Madison of the Fourteenth Amendment, observed in his final summation in the House:
[t]here remains a want now, in the Constitution of our country,
which the proposed amendment will supply. What is it? It is the
power in the people ... to do that by Congressional enactment
which hitherto they have not had the power to do ... that is to
protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the
citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person
...whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the [already] unconstitutional acts of any State.
Allow me ... in passing, to say that this amendment takes
from no State any right that ever pertained to it. No State ever
had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to any
freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although
many of them have assumed and exercised the power ... .55
Thus in Congressman Bingham's view, the privileges or immunities
and related clauses entailed no new constitutional prohibition whatsoever; they merely authorized congressionalenforcement of prohibitions
already contained in the Constitution.
Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, a major force in congressional
Reconstruction, introduced the proposed amendment in the House on
behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction (May 8, 1866). He
agreed with his colleague Bingham that the measure would correct the
"want" of congressional enforcement power. But for him the theme of
section 1 (he did not distinguish one clause from another) was racial
equaliy:
The first section prohibits the States from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or unlawfully depriving them of life, liberty, or property, or of denying to
any person within their jurisdiction the "equal" protection of the
laws.
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will
not admit that every one of these provisions is just. They are all
55.

GLOBE,

supra note 2, at 2542.
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asserted, in some form or other, in our Declaration or organic
law. But the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and
is not a limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that
defect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the
States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall
operate equally upon all. Whatever law punishes a white man for
a crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same
way. . . . Whatever law protects the white man shall afford
"equal" protection to the black man. Whatever means of redress
is afforded to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows
the white man to testify in court shall allow the man of color to
do the same. These are great advantages over their present
codes. . . . I need not enumerate these partial and oppressive
laws. Unless the Constitution should restrain them those States
will . . . crush to death the hated freedmen. Some answer,
"Your civil rights bill secures the same things." That is partly
true, but a law is repealable by a majority.
Our fathers had been compelled to postpone the principles
of their great Declaration, and wait for their full establishment
till anO..56
more propitious time. That time ought to be present

now. ...5

Thus unlike his colleague Bingham, Congressman Stevens thought the
privileges or immunities and related clauses did indeed add new
prohibitions to the Constitution, prohibitions calculated to achieve the
ideal of equality adumbrated in the Declaration of Independence but
not in the pre-1868 Constitution-and only partly in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.
Senator Jacob Howard, who introduced the proposed amendment
in the Senate (May 23, 1866) on-behalf of the Joint Committee, agreed
with Messrs. Bingham and Stevens as to the congressional enforcement
power, but differed from each of them concerning the nature of the
prohibitions Congress would have power to enforce against the states:
It would be a curious question to solve what are the privileges
and immunities of citizens of each of the states. . . . It would be
a somewhat barren discussion. But it is certain the clause was
introduced in the Constitution [article IV, sec. 2]1 7 for some good
purpose. . . . I am not aware that the Supreme Court has ever
undertaken to define either the nature or the extent of the privileges and immunities thus guaranteed. . . . But we may gather
some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judi56. Id. at 2459.
57. Article IV, § 2, cl. 1 of the Constitution provides that: "The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
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ciary by referring to [Coirfeld v. Coryell].5 s
After quoting at length from Coqield, Senator Howard continued:
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of
in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To
these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they
are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights guaranteed . . . by, the first eight amendments of the
Constitution. . ..
Other views were also expressed.6" At the end of the debates Senator Hendricks observed: "I have not heard any Senator accurately deSenator
fine, what are the rights and immunities of citizenship.'
Reverdy Johnson, one of the great constitutional lawyers of his day,
remarked:
I am decidedly in favor of the first part of the section which
defines what citizenship shall be, and in favor of that part of the
section which denies to a State the right to deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, but I think it
quite objectionable to provide [the privileges and immunities
clause], simply because I do not understand what will be the effect of that. 2
Apart from Senator Howard, Congressman Andrew Rogers is the
only one who, during the entire congressional debate, offered more
than a few, limited generalities on the privileges or immunities clause.
An opposing Democrat, he found that "it consolidates everything":
What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all the rights
we have under the laws of the country are embraced under the
definition of privileges and immunities. The right to vote is a
privilege. The right to marry is a privilege. The right to contract
is a privilege. The right to be a juror is a privilege. The right to
be a judge or President of the United States is a privilege. I hold
if that ever becomes a part of the fundamental law of the land it
will prevent any State from refusing to allow anything to any58. GLOBE, supra note 2, at 2765 (referring to Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230)). See note 50 supra.
59. GLOBE, supra note 2, at 2765.
60. Several supporters of the proposed amendment referred approvingly to the natural
law dicta in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230), with respect
to the meaning of the words "privileges and immunities" in article IV, section 2, of the
Constitution. Apart from the vagueness of natural law itself, and the fact that the Corfeld
language is only trial court rhetoric, there is this difficulty: as used in article IV (unlike its
use in the Fourteenth Amendment), the term "privileges and immunities" is largely selfdefining, as indeed it was where similarly used in the Articles of Confederation. Article IV,
section 2 simply means that whatever benefits a state affords its own citizens, the same must
be afforded to visiting citizens of sister states. It is, in sum, a comity provision.
61. GLOBE, supra note 2, at 3039. See also id. at 2934.
62. Id. at 3041.
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body embraced under this term of privileges and immunities. . . . It will result in a revolution . ...
Obviously even the chief sponsors of the proposed amendment
were at odds as to the meaning of the privileges or immunities clause.
Others, including the measure's chief opponents, recognized and
stressed its ambiguity. The fact is that, apart from what we have just
quoted, there was virtually no discussion of this provision in the Congress that proposed it. Apparently differing views, hopes and fears
were "reconciled" by the device of ambiguity in a sounding phrase.
There can be no doubt that many who spoke on the matter in Congress recognized that an immediate purpose of the proposed amendment was to constitutionalize section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which had just been enacted over a presidential veto (based in part on
constitutional grounds). Considering the language of the privileges or
immunities clause (vis-A-vis that of the Civil Rights Act) and the views
of Messrs. Stevens, Bingham, Howard, Hendricks, Johnson and Rogers, we cannot accept the [Berger] view that its intended function was
simply to incorporate the substance of the 1866 statute into the Constitution. Indeed the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" would be a strange, irrational way of referring to the
"rights" covered by that legislation. The making of contracts, the acquisition and conveying of property, for example, are state law matters
thaf have nothing to do with national citizenship. Congress, composed
largely of lawyers, could hardly have thought otherwise. Nor have we
found in the leading news journals of the day even a hint of evidence
which suggests that the ratifying public thought the "privileges" clause
was a shorthand reference to the civil "rights" legislation of 1866. The
racial equality which the Civil Rights Act explicitly mandates in contractual and conveyancing matters is covered presumably by the equality clause of the amendment in question.
Our function is to enforce constitutional mandates, not to make
them. The term "privileges or immunities" does not provide, and so
must be given, content. We are not a constituent assembly; to give
meaning to this meaningless phrase would be to act as though we were
one. If it be argued that the privileges or immunities clause is an embodiment of natural law, the answer is clear: our concern is manmade
legal rules, not amorphous moral postulates. Nor is it our function to
63. Id. at 2538. For a study of contemporary views of the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Cerney, Appendix to the Opinion of the Court, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
455 (1979) (printed infra).
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enforce as law clumsy, all-things-to-all-men political slogans (if that is
what is here involved).
We conclude that the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is non-justiciable, because it provides no judicially
discoverable or manageable standards for adjudication.14 Whether it is
altogether void for vagueness, or rather presents political questions for
resolution by the democratic process is not now before us. That is a
problem for another day. Meanwhile we do not suggest the privileges
or immunities clause is utterly without significance. For to grant citizenship to all on grounds of birth within the domain and to decree,
however inarticulately, the inviolability thereof is an exercise in egalitarianism. It fortifies our view below as to the meaning of "equal
protection."
2

The EqualProtection Clause

Taken literally and alone, it may be that the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is too obscure for judicial enforcement. For surely the legislative process must virtually cease if
only those statutes are permissible which literally give all persons
"equal protection." Much, if not quite all, legislation as we know it
ppts differing people in separate categories and thereby treats them differently. In sum, classification is indispensable to the legislative process. The equal protection clause, then, must have a narrower meaning
than its bare words may suggest.
We know what all men know: the Black Codes were the South's
response to the Thirteenth Amendment; Congress sought to undercut
them with the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and in the face of doubts as to
the Act's constitutionality, Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve what in principle the 1866 Act sought to do: namely,
to give citizenship to blacks and to insure at least that they were to
have, in the words of the Act, "full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens. 6 5 Read in this context, surely there is more than an
intimation of equal treatment for all races in the equal protection
clause. This reading becomes unmistakable, we think, when the clause
is seen as part of a common pattern immanent in the three Civil War
64. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Even some quite precise provisions of the Constitution are not subject to judicial enforcement. See, e.g., Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
65. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 21, 14 Stat. 27 (1868).
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Amendments,66 the Civil Rights Acts of 1866,67 1870,6, 1871,69 1875,70
the five Reconstruction Acts,7 ' the Freedmen's Bureau measures 72 and
the history that preceded them.
In the long view, surely these measures, like Jefferson's Declara-

tion and Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg, are but steps toward the
ideal of equality implicit in the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man-an ideal we do not always honor, yet never quite forget.

The history, the pattern of response, the abiding dream all indicate to
us beyond the possibility of doubt an overriding purpose: to secure for
all races each of the state-given benefits which the numerically domi-

nant race enjoys. The Fourteenth Amendment bestows American citizenship by virtue of birth within this country regardless of race; it

enjoins (clumsily) state interference therewith; it forbids the states to
deny anyone due process or the equal protection of the law; it authorizes Congress to enforce these mandates. What is this but a declaration that the laws of a state shall be the same for each and every race;
that all persons regardless of race shall stand equal before the law; and

that no state shall classify or discriminate on grounds of race?
It is true that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment merely pe-

nalizes and does not forbid suffrage discrimination.73 That quirk in the
otherwise uniform thrust of equal treatment in the measures just men66. In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, invoked in the case presently before this
Court, the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were passed in the years following the
Civil War.
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1.
The Fifteenth Amendment provides that: "The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
Congress was given power to enforce each of these amendments by appropriate
legislation.
67. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1868).
68. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1871).
69. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1873); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat.
433 (1871).
70. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
71. Act of Dec. 22, 1869, ch. 3, 16 Stat. 59 (1871); Act of Mar. 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat.
41 (1869); Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14 (1869); Act of Mar. 23. 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat.
2 (1869); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1868).
72. The Bureau was created by Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1866).
73. Section 2 provides for the reduction in the number of a state's representatives in the
House according to the proportion of male inhabitants of the state who are over the age of
twenty-one and citizens of the United States whose right to vote is denied or abridged.
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tioned was immediately removed by the Fifteenth Amendment.7 4 By
treating suffrage separately and differently in section 2, those who gave
us the Fourteenth Amendment made clear their purpose to exclude
voter problems from the equal protection and related clauses of section
1. In short, the Fifteenth Amendment makes good the omission of suffrage rights in section 1 and the merely partial protection thereof in
section 2 of the earlier amendment.
3. The Due Process Clause
If as a matter of grammar and *rhetoric the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is less than obvious, some six hundred
years of history since Magna Charta save it from unintelligibility.
"Due process of law" long ago became a term of art. As such it was
included in the Fifth Amendment and is defined by, as we have said,
those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our
ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to
their civil and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country.75
Obviously the due process language of the Fourteenth is the due
process language of the Fifth Amendment. To incorporate the words is
to incorporate their traditional meaning, and no more-at least in the
absence of any potent evidence to the contrary, of which we find none.
It may be well to indicate that we repudiate as totally mistaken the
unfortunate language in Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 6 which may be read
as giving due process an alien, substantive content. Let that disaster
stand for all time as warning to judges who-unmindful of their proper
role-attempt to impose extra-constitutional policies upon the community under the guise of interpretation. We will not in this case extend
the Dred Scott lapse by purporting to find substantive meanings in a
long-settled procedural term of art. Due process means a fair hearing
and nothing more. We need not now decide whether that concept, having been written into the Constitution, has lost its ancient potential for
(non-substantive) growth via the judicial process.
Lest these words be deemed more expansive than we intend, we
74. See note 67 supra.
75. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277
(1856).
76. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857). The Dred Scott decision held that an act of
Congress prohibiting ownership of slaves north of a certain boundary violated due process
in that slaves were property, and that to deprive their owners of property rights merely
because they traveled beyond the statutory boundary deprived the owners of rights under
the Fifth Amendment.
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add a few more. As we have said following Lord Coke: "The words
'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same
meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Charta." 7 In
the context of the pervading thrust of all the Civil War Amendments
and accompanying legislation, we understand due process of law to
mean this: each person charged with crime is entitled to fair accusatory
and trial process in accordance with the general "law of the land" as it
is understood in the several states. This is to say, no one may be subjected to any extraordinary procedure or denied fair procedure because
of his race. We are not aware of anything in the background or legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment which suggests it was calculated to give Congress or federal courts general supervisory control
over state judicial proceedings. The amendment, as we have said, was
aimed at racial injustice.
Affirmed.

77. 2 EDWARD COKE'S INSTITUTE 50, quoted in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.

